Reactions to On the Genealogy of Morals and Nietzsche’s Immoralism

I chose to provide the preceding analysis of On the Genealogy of Morals only after discussing Human, All Too Human and Daybreak, because I wanted to show how these three works collectively provide a comprehensive and mainly consistent theory of morality. Furthermore, I preceded my interpretation of his theory with a discussion of Schopenhauer and Rée’s moral philosophies, because I believe that Nietzsche’s theory is best understood in contrast to their ideas. My decision to provide a broad overview of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy was made not only for the sake of completeness but, perhaps more importantly, for the sake of accuracy. I was concerned that an isolated analysis of any particular work of Nietzsche’s would leave gaps in our understanding that would inadvertently and erroneously be filled with our own presumptions about morality. We all possess our own familiar, albeit partial, ideas about what constitutes morality, and Nietzsche did not write any one book to dispel such prejudices in a clean sweep. While 118 Nietzsche’s entire body of work does not provide a completely stand-alone theory of morality—one that would need absolutely no gap filling with our own notions of morality —it does provide many, if not most, of the principles that would underlie such a self- contained theory. Consequently, Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, despite its presentation in aphoristic form, ought not to be treated as providing detached insights into the nature of morality. Rather, it is best viewed as a coherent system of thought that responded in earnest to prior moral philosophies and was developed over the span of his entire philosophic career. If one refuses to approach his moral philosophy in this way, one will at best fail to attain an adequate understanding of Nietzsche’s theory of morality and at worst harbor gross misunderstandings about that theory.

Scholars who have written about Nietzsche and his moral philosophy have focused primarily and almost exclusively on the last book we have considered, On the Genealogy of Morals. Their analyses have been helpful in their introduction of new ways to look at the three essays that comprise that book. They also have usefully taken up the issue of genealogy itself to explore the innovations and problems presented by that method of philosophizing. However, their disregard of Nietzsche’s pre-Genealogy moral philosophy and its context has resulted in the problems mentioned above. In particular, these scholars have expressed an interest in the significance of Nietzsche’s immoralism, but their focus on his ideas concerning the slave revolt, bad conscience, and asceticism in On the Genealogy of Morals has led them astray in their determination of that significance. While these scholars tend to approach Nietzsche’s immoralism from widely different angles, and it is therefore impossible to pinpoint one particular fault pertaining 119 to all, I will show how a few scholars’ arguments could be improved or refuted by the considerations I have made in my more comprehensive interpretation of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy.

When scholars consider Nietzsche’s immoralism, they naturally wonder about the effects a lack of morality in society would have on people’s behavior. An obvious concern is that immorality could very well entail the proliferation of “evil,” egoistic behavior, as follows from a belief that such behavior must be constantly kept in check by a morality that stresses compassion and selflessness. My preliminary response to this concern is that men, unfettered by a morality of pity, would probably experience a surge in so-called evil acts but that surge would not amount to a war of all against all. However, just how prevalent “evil” acts would become depends on the values that society chose to adopt in a post-moral world. Nietzsche suggests that evil acts should be welcomed and encouraged 10 if they bring value, whether to an individual or a community, but he does not encourage them if they possess no such value. At points he also suggests that a morality of pity is not needed for (and, indeed, can even frustrate) beneficent acts. His discussions of pre- Christian societies demonstrate a belief that the morality of pity is not necessary for men to live amongst each other and tend to one another’s well-being. The Greeks, for example, expressed a “more manly brother of pity” that involved “indignation at another’s unhappiness” and presumably compelled them to act on behalf of each another Keep in mind that a morality is not the only way for a society to possess values. As Nietzsche puts it in 10 Daybreak: “to recommend a goal to mankind is something quite different [than] to impose the demands of morality on mankind” (D, 63). Furthermore, he calls for a “revaluation” of values, not an abandonment of values. 120 (D, 48). Therefore, a value system designed by Nietzsche would probably not entail an undue amount of senseless harmfulness done toward others.

However, my response and these considerations are ultimately beside the point as Nietzsche’s philosophy only makes sense as an argument for immorality if we accept his contention that selflessness ought not to be valued in the first place. He clearly establishes himself in diametric opposition to a morality that values selflessness. As such, he values selfishness, personal fulfillment, and the like. This position entails a lack of concern over whether people are treated beneficently by their neighbors and it maintains that such a concern is not necessary and can even be harmful on the whole. Those scholars who are understandably concerned about whether immoralism would herald a decline in selflessness and a rise in selfishness have good enough reason for their concern; however, they ought not to look toward Nietzsche to either sympathize with them or demonstrate how immoralism actually preserves selflessness. Rather, his philosophy is meant to encourage them to abandon their faith in selflessness altogether and to begin worrying about the devaluation of selfishness that has taken place over the past two thousand years. Much of Nietzsche’s philosophy, as we have seen, is intended to persuade readers to revalue their valuation of selflessness and selfishness. When scholars fail to be persuaded, they typically take one of two stances with regard to his immoralism: either they protest its allowance of evil acts, or they argue that somehow it does not actually condone evil. Philippa Foot attempts to do the former by asserting that his immoralism does provide great concern for those who abhor evil, egoistic behavior. In an essay 121 entitled “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” Foot claims that “there was a side of Nietzsche’s deeply pathological psyche that seems to have gloried in the fact that his immoralism allowed, if done by certain people, even terrible deeds.” She correctly notes that 11 Nietzsche was not “preaching in favor of a new morality rather than against morality as such” and contends that in light of his pure immoralism, “it should [not] be argued that the virtue of justice can be accommodated within Nietzsche’s picture of splendid individuals finding each his own values and ‘his own way.’” While I would argue that 12 Nietzsche’s immorality does not necessarily imply that society cannot maintain any sort of value system for its members (i.e. it must let everyone do whatever they want), she is right to suspect that his immorality would be permissive to evil acts that violate the principles of a particular conception of justice. Foot’s conception of justice “require[s] a 13 certain recognition of equality between human beings” and, therefore, resonates with Nietzsche’s conception of justice as described in Human, All Too Human as something that “originates between parties of approximately equal power.” While Nietzsche would 14 sooner deny justice between men of different rank than try to demonstrate the equality of those men, Foot would rather do the opposite and finds Nietzsche’s “endless talk about inferiors and superiors” objectionable. 15 Philippa Foot, “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. Richard Schacht 11 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 8.

Ibid., 8, 9.12 To emphasize once again: value systems do not need to be moral, as “what is essential and invaluable 13 about every morality is that it is a long compulsion” (BGE, 77; emphasis added).

Ibid.; HAH, 49.14

Foot., 10.15 122 Foot, then, clearly exhibits distaste for Nietzsche’s immorality because it permits “evil” behavior that violates the very principles of justice that she holds dear. In addition to speculating with Thomas Mann that perhaps “Nietzsche had not faced the reality of evil” and, therefore, did not really know the full implications of his immorality, she finds an avenue for refuting Nietzsche in the following sentence: “To our objections on behalf of justice Nietzsche would, no doubt, reply that what should be in question is not whether we want to hold on to a moral mode of valuation, but whether we can do so with honesty.” With this speculation Foot sets up a straw man to attack, as Nietzsche 16 certainly would not have been satisfied to leave the question of the value of a moral mode of valuation off the table. We have seen the extent to which he refutes the attractiveness of the morality of pity, whether by dissecting the phenomenon of pity itself or exposing the will to self-cruelty that underlies it. However, Foot is thoroughly convinced that the prevailing morality is desirable and, consequently, must direct her attention to what she sees as fallacies in Nietzsche’s argument that “morality is tainted by certain pious falsehoods that are necessary to it.” 17

While criticizing the logic behind Nietzsche’s theory of morality is a perfectly acceptable way to rebut his immoralism, Foot fails to provide a persuasive set of criticisms. The first of her three criticisms involving “the ‘errors’ that Nietzsche saw as endemic to morality” is directed toward his argument that morality erroneously presupposes free will by insisting that men be held responsible for their actions. She 18 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Ibid.18 123 quotes a passage from Human, All Too Human we have discussed wherein Nietzsche proclaims that “man’s complete lack of responsibility for his behavior and for his nature, is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow” (HAH, 57). While she admits that “the theory of the will that he attacks would find few defenders today” and asserts that “moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible,” she puzzlingly concludes that Nietzsche “is surely wrong in thinking that we might have to give up thinking in a special way about the goodness of men.” Her 19 explanation that follows is murky and altogether too brief, but it seems to suggest that the very notion of responsibility presented by morality (the morality of pity, to be precise) somehow evinces the existence of that responsibility. In other words, some form of moral responsibility must exist because morality holds us responsible. Nietzsche would surely dismiss this logic as circular and blind to the very error he means to uncover. Regardless of whether this is an accurate representation of her argument, she fails to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s strict determinism does not ultimately make men unaccountable for their actions. Consequently, she fails to refute an error that Nietzsche claims to have found within morality. Her second criticism consists of two parts and fares no better than the first, as each part betrays a lack of understanding of Nietzsche’s argument against morality. She asserts that “second among the ‘errors’ Nietzsche claims to have found in morality there

Ibid., 11.19 124 is the classification of types of actions under the descriptions ‘good’ and ‘bad.’” The 20 classification of types as good or bad is, of course, an elementary thing for morality to do, so she might as well be restating the unhelpful fact that he thinks morality is erroneous. What she means by this statement seems two-fold: first, Nietzsche dislikes such a classification of types because it fails to consider the individuality of each actor. Foot claims that Nietzsche stresses the notion that “each individual action takes its character from the character of the one who does it” rather than from any character intrinsic to the action itself. In support of this view, she cites a passage from Twilight of the Idols with 21 which Nietzsche suggests that “the value of egoism depends on the physiological value of him who possesses it: it can be very valuable, it can be worthless and contemptible.” 22 While I have not undertaken an analysis of that work, she appears to be taking this passage out of context and using it to support her own theory of virtue ethics. Even if she has identified a viable idea in one of Nietzsche’s later works, this error does not constitute an important part of his exposure of morality, as we have seen him emphasize a great deal of other errors in his earlier works. The second meaning of her statement, however, is more central to her charge that Nietzsche has not actually uncovered an error behind morality. She discusses Nietzsche’s “genius for finding hidden motivations” and, specifically, his “discovery of the possibility of dubious motivation behind…acts of ‘kindness.’” Once again emphasizing individual 23 Ibid.20

Ibid., 11.21

Ibid., 6.22

Ibid., 12.23 125 actions performed by individual characters, she claims that Nietzsche’s argument only uncovers the deceptiveness of certain (if admittedly prevalent) actions while ignoring those actions actually backed by pure motives. Consequently, she suggests that “if Nietzsche extends the range of experience in which the standard of honesty about motives applies, moralists should not take this amiss.” However, there are two things 24 noticeably wrong with her argument here that Nietzsche’s uncovering of selfish motives has limited applicability to reality. First, Nietzsche would contend that actions are very frequently performed with consciously selfish intent even though they appear to be selfless to spectators. Second, and more importantly, his charge that men intentionally deceive others with regard to the true motives of their behavior is of secondary importance, as he makes clear in the aphorism “There are two kinds of deniers of morality” in Daybreak. His more important denial of morality, as we have seen, involves the insight that men are oblivious to the true, selfish motives behind their moral behavior. Thus, Nietzsche is not “mistaken about the import of his psychological observations,” because his observations actually uncover the pervasive, and in most circumstances unconscious, untruthfulness involved in all moral activity.

The third and final criticism Foot levels at Nietzsche’s immorality concerns his insistence of “‘the reciprocal dependence of the “good” and “wicked” drives’ and the derivation of good impulses from wicked ones.” She locates Nietzsche “far out in a 26 very doubtful field of psychological speculation” and claims that his ultimate “theory that

Ibid., 12.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 126 all ‘drives’ are contained in the Will to Power” reveals himself as “partly a mere speculating philosopher far exceeding any plausible basis for his speculations.” The 27 problem with this accusation is that Foot makes no effort to explain why Nietzsche is so wrong for suggesting that “good” and “wicked” drives grow from the same root. She may very well be right that Nietzsche’s ideas here are unfounded, but her dismissal of his ideas as mere speculation comes off as capricious. For these reasons, one could just as easily characterize her assertion that good and evil drives do not grow from the same root as equally unfounded. In addition to providing weak criticisms of Nietzsche’s immorality, Foot fails to address many of the problems that he has with morality qua morality and the morality of pity. In fact, she does not even make a distinction between these two concepts, which suggests that she does not fully understand his agenda. Concerning morality qua morality alone, she could have discussed, for example, morality’s harmfulness to originality and freedom, or its lack of well-defined goals. Both of these are criticisms of morality that extend beyond the narrow “errors” that he locates behind all moral modes of valuation. Furthermore, and as suggested earlier, she completely evades the issue of assessing a morality’s actual value. The discovery of the morality of pity as an intrinsically decadent and disabling way to view the world is central to Nietzsche’s immorality, and yet Foot sidesteps this central theme of his philosophy completely. Thus, she fails to effectively reject his immorality both because she misunderstands the fundamental concepts of his

Ibid., 13.27 127 theory of morality and because she refuses to defend the morality that she values—the morality of pity—from the attacks he directs toward its worth.

Frithjof Bergmann takes the opposite approach toward Nietzsche’s immoralism in his essay “Nietzsche and Analytic Ethics.” He claims that it has been impossible “to arrange the encounter in which conversation between Nietzsche and analytic ethics might finally begin,” because analytic philosophers assume “that we are basically egoistic” whereas Nietzsche “in no way subscribes to the dichotomy that places egoism on one side and morality on the other.” He describes the typical reaction of a student who feels 28 liberated by On the Genealogy of Morals: the student feels indignation at being duped by the slave revolt in morality, begins acting hyper-egoistically to make up for lost opportunities, and after a short period of time returns to his or her considerate ways after experiencing a social backlash to his or her temporary selfishness.

Bergmann claims that this reaction reveals an important assumption that modern man has about mankind: that it is thoroughly egoistic and needs morality to keep its egoism in check. Against this assumption, Bergmann argues that both Nietzsche and Hegel believed in the inherent selflessness of mankind and in the notion that “we are in fact very weak and frail and undeveloped, with very little sense of ourselves.” Thus, he 29 claims that “if one reads Nietzsche…taking for granted the assumption of egoism and the image of human nature that such egoism generates, Nietzsche simply does not make Frithjof Bergmann, “Nietzsche and Analytic Ethics,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. Richard 28 Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 77, 76.

Ibid., 89.29 128 sense!” More to the point, he asserts that “the sanctity of moral values is not most 30 urgently needed to hold [men] back [because] the worry is not that pandemonium and chaos are ready to erupt.” 31

This is admittedly a very clever way to salvage Nietzsche’s immoralism from accusations of sponsoring rampant selfishness. However, Bergmann is far from the truth when arguing that Nietzsche believes mankind is inherently selfless. As we saw in our discussion of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche believes that mankind is not even capable of truly unegoistic behavior. Rather, he stresses the notion that morality has erroneously ascribed selflessness to our behavior by concealing our true motives. The aphorism entitled “Pseudo-egoism” in Daybreak could be construed by Bergmann to support his case that “we are like marionettes, moved by the string of other people’s expectations, of other people’s threats and hopes and offers of reward.” However, this 32 aphorism is intended to demonstrate how morality prevents men from acting effectively in their own self-interest. Nietzsche certainly believes that mankind has become tame, harmless, and unable to fulfill its needs, but this outcome is a result of the moralization of mankind and not a reflection of mankind’s nature. Thus, immorality could very well lead to a rising tide of egoism as men regain their ability to serve themselves and value their preservation and advancement once again.

Like Bergmann, Maudemarie Clark provides an interpretation of Nietzsche’s immoralism that alleviates fears that it will lead to unchecked, harmful selfishness. In her

Ibid., 92.30

Ibid., 94.31

Ibid., 89.32 129 essay “Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality,” she makes the laudable observation that “we can[not] seriously confront [Nietzsche’s] thinking about morality unless we try first to understand his immoralism in terms of what he himself has to say about the concept of morality.” However, her interpretation of his concept of morality is 33 tainted by the presumption that morality must involve guilt and responsibility. She suggests that “it is the idea of blaming people for what they are that transforms the noble mode of valuation into a moral mode,” but provides no evidence that Nietzsche actually believed in this distinction. As I mentioned earlier in my discussion of On the 34 Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche himself refers to the noble mode of valuation as a master morality and, while he does emphasize the bad conscience associated with slave morality, he nowhere claims that this bad conscience makes slave morality any more of a morality than master morality. Furthermore, our discussion of Human, All Too Human and Daybreak revealed his actual definition of morality, which asserts that morality simply consists of obedience to custom. The morality of pity obviously builds upon this central definition of morality, but it cannot claim to represent morality qua morality with its innovations of guilt and responsibility.

This emphasis on what actually constitutes a morality is important because Clark essentially tries to use her definition to contend that Nietzsche simply wanted to rid morality of its guilt. Her intention of preserving the values of the morality of pity while shedding its guilt-ridden skin is betrayed by her insistence that “it is difficult to find in

Clark, 20.33

Ibid., 26. 130 Nietzsche’s discussion…any suggestion that he objects to…judgments of fairness.” Her 35 belief that Nietzsche did not really mean to sacrifice the concept of fairness with his immoralism leads her to conclude that “he denies that regarding obedience to the rules as a matter of fairness is equivalent to granting them the status of moral rules.” With this 36 loophole, she locates in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals “the possibility…of a nonmoral version of a social contract, involving what we can recognize to be nonmoral ideas of fairness, justice, obligation, indebtedness, and conscience.” In 37 other words, she believes that Nietzsche allows for “the possibility of gaining much of what morality gives us, indeed what we cannot do without, in alternative ways, and specifically without the tie to the ascetic ideal.” Thus, Clark fails to realize (or 38 subconsciously denies) that Nietzsche’s immoralism defies the values that modern men feel they “cannot do without” with its crusade against the unegoistic.

Arthur Danto also manages to avoid the unpleasantries of Nietzsche’s immoralism by portraying it in a watered-down version. He explores a range of non-moral concepts pertaining to On the Genealogy of Morals in his essay “Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals,” but writes explicitly about morality in the beginning and end of that essay. Taking his cue from the aphorism prefixed to the third essay (“Unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus wisdom wants us: She is a woman, and always loves only a warrior”),

Ibid., 28.35 Ibid.36

Ibid., 29.37

Ibid., 31.38 131 Danto claims that disinterestedness is one of Nietzsche’s central values. This leads him 39 to assert that Nietzsche’s “recommended morality” is one void of “goals and purposes”; it is a “morality of principle” meant to replace a “morality of means.” His portrayal of 40 Nietzsche as an “anticonsequentialist” is problematic for two primary reasons. First, 41 Nietzsche does not simply want to replace one morality with another, as we have seen. Therefore, Danto is not appreciating the exhaustiveness of Nietzsche’s immoralism. Secondly, Nietzsche expresses in Daybreak the desire for goals as long as they lie “in our own discretion” (D, 108). Thus, Danto’s insistence that Nietzsche wishes to restore to mankind “the posture of unconcern” with regard to goals appears premature and unwarranted. Unlike the other scholars I have discussed, Danto is not grappling overtly 42 with Nietzsche’s immoralism, but his interpretation of Nietzsche’s intentions for morality avoids the difficulties presented by his moral philosophy.

While the aforementioned scholars have shied away from facing the implications of Nietzsche’s immoralism head on, I believe that is important to assess his moral philosophy by attempting to evaluate how well Nietzsche answers the two questions that prompt his theory of morality: “Under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? And what value do they themselves possess?” (GM, 17) With regard to Nietzsche’s explanation of how we came to possess our value judgments “good and evil,” and his broader articulation of morality qua morality, I find his theory more Arthur Danto, “Some Remarks on The Genealogy of Morals,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. 39 Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 35.

Ibid., 35, 48.

Ibid., 35.41

Ibid., 48.42 132 comprehensive and persuasive than any other that I have studied. The accuracy of his description of morality’s emergence, however, is hard to question unless one possesses greater insight into the actual forces behind morality. For example, a refutation of Nietzsche’s contention that ressentiment was the central impulse behind the rise of Christianity and its accompanying moral mode of valuation is infeasible unless one possesses evidence that some force other than ressentiment actually induced the spread of Christianity. Furthermore, his logical consistency makes it difficult to point out any crucial flaws that would undermine the credibility of his moral philosophy. For these reasons, I must recognize his historical definition of morality as potentially valid until I encounter persuasive evidence to the contrary. Nietzsche’s assessment of the value of morality, and the morality of pity in particular, presents a different breed of challenges to anyone who attempts to assess the significance of his theory. His central argument against the morality of pity rests on his valuation of selfishness over selflessness, as he abhors the morality of pity for demanding unegoistic behavior of all men. To disagree with Nietzsche in regard to his devaluation of the morality of pity is to maintain that selflessness actually should be valued higher than selfishness. He provides many persuasive arguments for why selfishness is underappreciated and society’s obsession with selfless behavior is harmful. However, he ultimately fails to convince me that society should stress the goodness of selfishness over that of selflessness. Part of me feels as though he has made a good case for a revaluation of all values, but another part of me feels as though he may have failed to appreciate the manifold benefits that result from the hallowing of selflessness. Therefore, while I am 133 open to the possibility that his definition of morality is correct, I am wary of his insistence that the modern value system should be inverted. Consequently, I am also unable to accept his general attack on morality qua morality, because I do not endorse the rejection of even the particular type of morality belonging to modern society. 134 135