Opening

I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous—a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up against everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite. (EH, 326)

With these self-assured words, Friedrich Nietzsche begins the final chapter of Ecce Homo, the philosophical autobiography he wrote in the months leading up to his mental collapse in 1888. The message he provides in this chapter, entitled “Why I Am a Destiny,” is ominous yet joyful. It is the message of a philosopher who wants to convey the implications of his philosophy for the future of mankind. These implications are terrible (“we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of”) and yet he is proud of this terribleness (“I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me”) (EH, 326). Nietzsche, the self-described “annihilator par excellence,” appears like a mischievous madman who delights in opening Pandora’s box with full knowledge of the contents contained within. But why does he consider himself “the most terrible human being that has existed so far” and yet perhaps “the most beneficial” (EH, 327)? What does he think he has done and why is it so wonderful despite its ghastliness? And is there any rhyme or reason behind his megalomania?

The “revaluation of all values,” he proclaims, “that is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of humanity” (EH, 327). Nietzsche seeks to invert the already inverted values of mankind and believes that this inversion will constitute the “crisis without equal on earth.” Furthermore, this inversion involves the overthrowing of morality in two important ways:

Fundamentally, my term immoralism involves two negations. For one, I negate a type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, the beneficent. And then I negate a type of morality that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself—the morality of decadence or, more concretely, Christian morality. (EH, 328)

Nietzsche is unclear about the “type of man” he negates since his identification of this type as “benevolent” and “beneficent” suggests that it is influenced by “the morality of decadence,” which, as we will see, stresses the goodness of selflessness. This interpretation, however, fails to explain why Nietzsche claims to provide two negations of morality. Therefore, I understand the “type of man” in question as representative of any man who is considered good by a moral mode of valuation. Consequently, Nietzsche seeks to overthrow both morality itself and a particular morality along with it. He considers the “second contradiction the more decisive one,” since the current incarnation of morality is especially objectionable; however, morality qua morality also poses its own set of unacceptable problems (EH, 328). He understands that the so-called “self- overcoming of morality” will be experienced by mankind as “a real catastrophe,” but he simultaneously believes that this catastrophe is necessary to free mankind from the hostility to life that morality sustains (EH, 328, 333).

In several places throughout this chapter, Nietzsche poses the following question to both himself and his readers: “Have I been understood?” This question is meant to encourage readers to slow down and reassess whether they truly do understand Nietzsche, his philosophy, and its implications. It also reflects Nietzsche’s concern that no one may understand him. He believes that he has uncovered a truth of unmatched importance and yet fears that the world has been blinded for so long that it may not appreciate his revelation. The appreciation he desires, however, would avoid two extremes. On the one hand, he does not want to be simply dismissed as a “buffoon”; on the other, he does not want to be “pronounced holy,” as he claims that “there is nothing in me of a founder of a religion” (EH, 326). Therefore, he wants his philosophy to be properly evaluated so that it becomes neither ignored nor abused.

I will attempt to provide a better understanding of Nietzsche’s call for a revaluation of all values by presenting a comprehensive interpretation of his theory of morality. I believe that he does provide a coherent and internally logical moral philosophy, one developed over the span of his philosophical career that provides cogent arguments against the desirability of morality in modern society. Accordingly, I will analyze three of his main works: Human, All Too Human; Daybreak; and On the Genealogy of Morals. While all of his works could be examined to better understand his theory of morality, these three are the most relevant to his development of that theory. In addition to analyzing these works by Nietzsche, I have chosen to examine the moral philosophies of two other nineteenth-century philosophers—Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Paul Rée (1841-1901)—because their ideas profoundly influenced Nietzsche’s theory of morality. Thus, I will begin by looking at what they had to say about the nature of morality, and I will later relate Nietzsche’s thoughts about morality back to their own.

My investigation into Nietzsche’s theory of morality culminates in a critical examination of On the Genealogy of Morals, the book that has been given the most attention by scholars interested in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. I will provide an interpretation of this work that fits into my interpretation of his theory as a whole, and I will engage the secondary literature related to this work to demonstrate how On the Genealogy of Morals can be better understood if viewed in light of Nietzsche’s entire moral philosophy. I will conclude by considering a peculiarity of his relationship with morality and by providing some remarks concerning the political implications of his immoralism.