Schopenhauer’s Criticism of the Basis Given to Ethics by Kant

Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s theory of morality in the first part of the essay is particularly interesting because, as we will see, Schopenhauer presents many ideas with which Nietzsche later agrees. Generally speaking, Schopenhauer was a Kantian philosopher. He can be labeled as such because his philosophy relies entirely on Kant’s greatest contribution to Western philosophy—the distinction between the world as it appears to us (the phenomenon) and the world as it is in itself (the noumenon). However, despite Schopenhauer’s acknowledged indebtedness to Kant, Schopenhauer believed that Kant had overestimated the ability of pure reason to provide a priori knowledge when he developed his theory of morality. Kant had argued – first in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) – that humans (and all rational beings, for that matter) could use the power of reason to determine the fundamental principle of morality, and consequently know right from wrong, without resorting to any empirical data whatsoever. Furthermore, he believed that the use of pure reason led rational beings to obey the “categorical imperative,” or law of morality, that orders one to “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law.” Kant believed that rational beings 2 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 30. 9 were compelled to obey the categorical imperative out of a sense of duty and not out of a desire to produce the most fortunate outcomes. Therefore, his moral philosophy depended entirely on the belief that reason alone could both prescribe rules of behavior and compel rational beings to follow those rules.

Schopenhauer objects to Kant’s theory on many grounds. However, before considering his objections, it will be useful to point out the one aspect of Kant’s theory that Schopenhauer actually commends explicitly and one aspect of which he shows appreciation implicitly. Schopenhauer asserts that almost all of the ethical systems prior to Kant’s were eudaemonistic. By “eudaemonistic” he means that these ethical systems valued moral behavior because that behavior produced or coincided with happiness. The ethics of the ancients, he contends, were eudaemonistic because they held that “virtue and supreme happiness were identical,” as were the ethics of the moderns (prior to Kant) because they held that “supreme happiness [was] the consequence of virtue” (BM, 49). Schopenhauer appears to have works such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in mind when describing ancient ethics and the New Testament in mind when describing modern ethics. Unlike either of these ethics, Kant’s ethics held that favorable consequences were irrelevant to the moral worth of actions. Rational beings, according to him, ought to act out of a sense of duty, not out of a desire to become happier. Therefore, Schopenhauer applauds Kant for “having purged ethics of all eudaemonism” (BM, 49).

Schopenhauer also appreciates that Kant did not overtly base his theory of morality on theological grounds, although he neglects to express his appreciation explicitly. As we will see shortly, Schopenhauer criticizes Kant’s theory for sharing a 10 fundamental quality with ethical systems that do overtly base themselves on the will of God. He objects to the existence of this quality in Kant’s theory because he believes that it can only be justified by the role of God in moral matters. Since Schopenhauer argues that Kant should have avoided the incorporation of this quality, and not that he should have incorporated God, we can infer that he appreciated Kant’s omission of God from his theory. The reason for this appreciation will become clear later when see that Schopenhauer’s theory was not theological. The first major criticism that Schopenhauer directs toward Kant’s theory concerns the idea of moral laws. Schopenhauer claims that Kant’s “first false step” was to assume without justification that moral laws even existed (BM, 52). Kant claimed that “in a practical philosophy we are not concerned with stating reasons for what happens, but with giving laws as regards what ought to happen, even though it may never happen” (BM, 52). Schopenhauer considers this approach a petitio principii, and argues that “the student of ethics as well as the philosopher generally must be content with the explanation and interpretation…of what actually is or happens” (BM, 52). He admits that there are natural laws, such as the law of motivation (or the principle of sufficient reason) and those put forth by Kant in Metaphysics of Nature, but he asserts that “moral laws, apart from human ordinance, State institution, or religious doctrine, cannot be assumed as existing without proof” (BM, 53). Schopenhauer also objects to Kant’s use of moral laws by claiming that his idea of them is absurd for either of two reasons. On the one hand, if we are to understand a moral law, like the law of motivation, as implying “absolute necessity,” as Kant does in the 11 preface to Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, that law must be obeyed in all circumstances and at all times (BM, 53). However, Schopenhauer asserts that moral laws are “frequently, indeed as a rule, ineffective” (BM, 53). On the other hand, if we are to understand a moral law as creating a duty that may or may not be fulfilled, as Kant also does in the first section, then those who obey the law, according to Schopenhauer, must have a sufficient incentive to do so (BM, 54). Schopenhauer claims that “every ought derives all sense and meaning simply and solely in reference to threatened punishment or promised reward” (BM, 55). Because Kant’s categorical imperative imposes an obligation on rational beings and yet presents neither threat of punishment nor promise of reward, Schopenhauer concludes that Kant’s idea of duty is meaningless.

Furthermore, Kant’s assertion that there are natural laws of morality tends to undermine the limited praise that Schopenhauer has for his theory. While his theory is not overtly theological, Schopenhauer believes that Kant surreptitiously derived his sense of duty from the Mosaic Decalogue. Therefore, he suggests that “from theological morals Kant had borrowed [the] imperative form of ethics tacitly and without examining it” (BM, 57). Kant’s theory is therefore theological in nature even if it lacks the central theological element, God.

Kant’s idea of natural moral laws also undermines the praise Schopenhauer has for the theory’s supposed rejection of eudaemonism. Schopenhauer claims that “everything done with respect to reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as such is without purely moral value” (BM, 56). Because Kant claims that rational beings have a duty to act morally, and that duty implies punishment or 12 reward whether or not there is a mechanism for either punishment or reward, Schopenhauer believes that Kant’s moral actions are inherently selfish and therefore not moral at all. This selfishness comes from acting morally for the sake of avoiding punishment or obtaining reward, and therefore maximizing personal happiness, rather than out of any type of impersonal motivation. Schopenhauer suggests that Kant even discreetly provided a mechanism for reward in an idea of the “highest good.” Therefore, he claims that Kant’s theory of morality is ultimately eudaemonistic by asserting that the eudaemonism “Kant had solemnly thrust as an intruder from the front door of his system…now creeps in again at the back under the name of the highest good” (BM, 56).

In addition to criticizing Kant’s theory for its incorporation of moral laws, Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for basing his ethics entirely on a priori knowledge. Kant believed that knowledge of moral principles and rules could be obtained solely by the use of pure reason and without the assistance of any information gathered by experience. He wrote that morality “must not be sought in man’s nature (the subjective) or in the circumstances of the world (the objective),” and that “here nothing whatever can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, i.e., from anthropology” (BM, 61). In other words, he believed that a posteriori, or empirical, knowledge was completely useless to someone who wanted to determine the nature of morality. As Schopenhauer puts it, “by discarding every empirical basis of morals [Kant] rejects all inner, and even more definitely all outer, experience” (BM, 62).

Schopenhauer has three primary objections to Kant’s rejection of empiricism and his theory’s reliance on pure reason. All three objections convey Schopenhauer’s 13 skepticism that the faculty of reason alone is as powerful and fundamental to human knowledge and behavior as Kant thought it was. First, he doubts that pure reason, unaided by experience, can adequately inform a philosopher about the nature of morality. He asserts that Kant’s insistence that pure reason could do so led him to a “few [moral] concepts which are entirely abstract, wholly insubstantial, and likewise floating about entirely in air” (BM, 62). Furthermore, Schopenhauer believes that empiricism is essential to the knowledge of moral principles and foundations. He begins his own investigation of morality by “first looking around a little at the lives of men” rather than depending on “intuitive apprehension” (BM, 121).

Secondly, Schopenhauer rejects Kant’s conception of reason and its relation to human beings. He contends that Kant believed pure reason was “the inner and external essence of man,” as well as “something existing by itself” (BM, 64, 63). As the essence of man, reason was treated by Kant as the only thing that could possibly lead men to moral behavior. As something existing by itself, it was something that could be possessed by other “possible rational beings” (BM, 63). Consequently, Kant believed that morality could hypothetically apply to non-humans. Schopenhauer, however, claims that reason is “the exclusive attribute of the human race,” yet also “something secondary and appertaining to the phenomenon…whereas the real kernel in man…is his will” (BM, 64). The importance of these distinctions will become clear when we examine Schopenhauer’s theory of morality, which bases itself on the power of the will rather than that of reason. Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the will rather than the faculty of reason is also evident in his third and final objection to the reliance of Kant’s theory on pure reason. 14 Schopenhauer believes that pure reason cannot suffice to control “the violence and fury of passions” that compel men to act in immoral ways (BM, 75). He declares that “like every motive that moves the will, the moral stimulus must certainly be one that announces itself automatically and hence works positively, and consequently be one that is real” (BM, 75). Pure reason, he claims, does not ordinarily move the will because men do not “automatically…look around for and inquire about a law for [their] will” (BM, 74). In effect, Schopenhauer is claiming that the will (which is influenced and directed by the passions) ordinarily exerts more control over human behavior than reason, and any moral stimulus that would regularly prevent the will’s egoistic tendencies from leading men to immoral behavior must be ever-present and strong enough to subdue that will. He seems to suggest that even if reason did provide a legitimate moral law for men to obey out of duty, men would ordinarily not obey that moral law because they would fail to consult their reason as a guide for most of their actions. Thus, as we will see next, Schopenhauer presents an alternative moral impetus that he thinks is strong enough to move the will and therefore alter human behavior – namely, the will itself.