Conclusion

Throughout this essay, I have attempted to provide a better understanding of Nietzsche’s call for a “revaluation of all values” by piecing together both his definition of morality and his valuation of morality. In my discussions about his valuation of morality, I have limited myself to an analysis of Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality, criticisms that have relied on his definition of morality qua morality and the morality of pity in particular. These criticisms, if viewed alone, might lead one to believe that he condemned morality exclusively and failed to see any advantages to the development of moralities. Such a view, however, would inadequately capture the historical role that Nietzsche envisions for morality in its service to humanity. Despite his relentless criticisms of morality, he actually provides some crucial acknowledgements of its worth in the progression of mankind toward a more advanced state. These acknowledgements are double-sided—they recognize the aspects of morality for which we should be grateful while simultaneously discouraging us from condoning morality by consigning morality to the dustbin of history. Along with his consignation of morality to a particular, bygone era of mankind, he highlights the direction away from morality in which mankind will move, a direction that will entail significant changes to both the individual and society. Therefore, it is important to look at these acknowledgements if we are to better understand the implications of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy for the future of mankind and politics.

Most of Nietzsche’s acknowledgements of the historical worth of morality come from On the Genealogy of Morals. These acknowledgments can be divided, like his criticisms, between those directed toward morality qua morality and those directed toward the morality of pity. His appreciation of morality qua morality, or morality of custom, separately involves both the individual and society at large. We have already seen in our discussion of the second essay how he believes that morality was originally intended to make men more calculable, and we saw in Daybreak how this process of making men calculable had and continues to have detrimental effects on individuality. However, Nietzsche recognizes the historical worth of the morality of custom for the individual by interpreting it as a means to an end.

After a discussion of the effects of morality on the individual, he asserts the following: If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral… (GM, 59) The qualities of the “sovereign individual,” which Nietzsche describes at length, make this individual appear like a higher type of man who has not quite arrived on the scene of human history. He possesses “a sensation of mankind come to completion,” he is a “master of free will,” and the “power over oneself and over fate…has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct” (GM, 59, 60). These qualities could be construed to apply to modern man and, consequently, modern man could be identified with the sovereign individual. However, Nietzsche’s specification of the 137 sovereign individual as “supramoral” suggests that such a man exists in the future, as the whole of his moral philosophy is premised on the notion that mankind is not yet free from morality. Regardless, his insistence that such a man constitutes the central “fruit” of the morality of custom evinces his belief that morality can be thanked for the production of the highest type of man.

Nietzsche describes a similar progression for the community at large several sections later. He describes the community as an entity that “stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, that of the creditor to his debtors” (GM, 71). The prehistoric community is weak and must treat the “lawbreaker [as] a debtor who has not merely failed to make good the advantages and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually attacked his creditor” (GM, 71). As a result of this attitude, the prehistoric community vents “every kind of hostility” upon criminals who threaten the peace secured by society (GM, 17). However, Nietzsche claims that “as its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual’s transgressions so seriously” (GM, 72). Instead of imposing strict punishments, society “attain[s] such a consciousness of power that it [allows] itself the noblest luxury possible to it—letting those who harm it go unpunished” (GM, 72). This ultimate attitude, while not explicitly supramoral, parallels the previous notion of supramorality, because the idea of “mercy” in Nietzsche’s philosophy is associated with immorality, as we saw in our discussion of Human, All Too Human (GM, 73). His characterization of this progress as society “overcoming itself”—along with his remark that “the justice which began with, ‘everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged,’ ends by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go 138 free”—suggests that a community that punished sternly was necessary for the development of a community that disavows punishment completely (GM, 73, 72). This merciful community has also not yet arrived, as society obviously continues to punish its lawbreakers. Thus, here we see a higher type of community that will culminate in the future and derive from a type of community burdened by the characteristics of morality.

Nietzsche also acknowledges the historical value of the morality of pity in numerous places.

After describing the “intestinal morbidity” of priests in the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, he admits that “it was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became an interesting animal” who possessed a soul with “depth” (GM, 32, 33). Furthermore, he claims that “human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it” (GM, 33). Both of these statements reflect a belief that the impulses that created the morality of pity were also responsible for producing the richness and peculiarity of humanity. A similar sentiment is shared in the second essay when he describes the internalization of instincts as “the result of a forcible sundering [of man] from his animal past” (GM, 85). Yet, Nietzsche’s remarks are also forward-looking and suggest that the morality of pity is preparatory. He asserts that the internalization of instincts made mankind “pregnant with a future” and the bad conscience is an illness “as pregnancy is an illness” (GM, 85, 88). The forces behind the morality of pity create valuable potential yet leave it to other developments to fulfill that potential. Had Nietzsche described the morality of pity as a phenomenon that remolded and completed mankind, such potential would not 139 still exist for modern man. However, he portrays the emergence of the morality of pity as coupled with the characterization of man as “not a goal but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise” (GM, 85). Thus, the morality of pity (in addition to morality, generally speaking) constitutes a means by which modern men can achieve a higher type.

Ultimately, all of these acknowledgements of the value of morality suggest that mankind would not have been better off if morality had never arisen. They simultaneously suggest that, despite its historical value, morality should not be considered permanently desirable, because much of its value resides in the potential it has given mankind. As we can gather from Nietzsche’s relentless insistence that mankind abandon morality, this potential can be fulfilled only if mankind sheds the very morality that gave it potential in the first place. This shedding of morality, however, does not entail the shedding of all its positive effects. Nietzsche certainly does not wish for mankind to reacquire a shallow soul, nor does he want men to lose their conscience. Rather, he wants them to liberate themselves from the harmful effects of morality while simultaneously preserving its valuable effects. The power to identify exhaustively which effects are desirable and which are undesirable, however, is not claimed by Nietzsche. While he has provided mankind with guidance by suggesting a revaluation of values that will restore the value attributed to selfishness, he explicitly denies the right to “tender prescriptions as to the path to happiness” (D, 63). He certainly does not provide a roadmap for the future and, as I have argued, he provides no guarantees that selfishness will not lead to behavior that would disgust any adherent to the prevailing morality of pity. Thus, the path toward immoralism requires much self-examination on the part of humanity, self-examination 140 that Nietzsche welcomes in light of the millennia throughout which mankind has accepted the values of morality without inquiring into the value of those values.

This need for self-examination is reflected by the political considerations of Nietzsche’s immoralism. To a certain extent, he indicates the type of political changes that would accompany a revaluation of all values. In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, he contends that “the healthy should be segregated from the sick,” meaning those suffering the least from the morality of pity should be isolated from those suffering the most (GM, 124). He believes that physical separation is needed to prevent weak and selfless individuals from emasculating those who have strong, selfish inclinations, as he does not expect everyone to regain their strength overnight. This, in addition to his clear identification of democracy with the disempowered masses, suggests that an aristocratic form of government that recognized the inequalities between individuals would be most appropriate for his immoralism.

However, the scarcity of his overtly political suggestions can be interpreted as deferential, as he seems to desire that mankind find its own ways to reorganize itself in the absence of morality. This interpretation is supported by multiple passages from Daybreak, such as when he declares that “novel experiments shall be made in ways of life and modes of society” and when he encourages mankind to construct anew the laws of life and action…and found little experimental states” (D, 101, 190, 191). This prescription of experimentalism rather than any particular form of government suggests His identification of democracy with the masses can be seen in passages such as the following: “who can 43 say whether modern democracy…does not signify in the main a tremendous counterattack [to the master race]” (GM, 31). 141 that his immoralism will herald an age of political adaptation in which communities will attempt to find forms of government that promote their values most effectively. Freed from the influence of morality, however, these communities will choose political arrangements that satisfy values the value of which they constantly reassess. Therefore, we can also expect mankind to undergo an extended, and perhaps unending, period of political experimentation, rather than to settle down with a final form of government that supports an everlasting value system.

The political implications of immoralism obviously extend far beyond these considerations. My main concern has been only to provide a foundational understanding of Nietzsche’s theory of morality and its practical insistence that mankind invert its cherished values. As such, I have attempted to provide the groundwork for further discussions about the social implications of his philosophy. Nietzsche is often considered a thinker who was not terribly concerned with politics; yet, his insistence on tackling issues that affect the whole of mankind necessarily makes him a political philosopher. The implicitness of his philosophy’s political significance ensures that investigations into the seemingly non-political aspects of his philosophy will always be necessary to obtain a firm grasp of the political ramifications of his ideas. 142 143